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In defense of the personal/impersonal distinction in moral
psychology research: Cross-cultural validation of the dual process
model of moral judgment
Adam B. Moore∗ N. Y. Louis Lee† Brian A. M. Clark‡ Andrew R. A. Conway§
Abstract
The dual process model of moral judgment (DPM; Greene et al., 2004) argues that such judgments are influenced by
both emotion-laden intuition and controlled reasoning. These influences are associated with distinct neural circuitries
and different response tendencies. After reanalyzing data from an earlier study, McGuire et al. (2009) questioned the
level of support for the dual process model and asserted that the distinction between emotion evoking moral dilemmas
(personal dilemmas) and those that do not trigger such intuitions (impersonal dilemmas) is spurious. Using similar
reanalysis methods on data reported by Moore, Clark, & Kane (2008), we show that the personal/impersonal distinction
is reliable. Furthermore, new data show that this distinction is fundamental to moral judgment across widely different
cultures (U.S. and China) and supports claims made by the DPM.
Keywords: moral judgment, dual process model, Ex-Gaussian method, culture.
1 Introduction
The dual process model of moral judgment (DPM;
Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008;
Greene, Nystrom, Engle, Darley, & Cohen, 2004;
Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001)
contends that moral judgments are the product of two
partially separable neural systems—one fast, automatic
and affective, the other slower, effortful, and more ab-
stract. A significant body of research has emerged from
this proposal, with researchers employing a variety of ap-
proaches to characterize the nature and function of each
system, as well as their interaction. These efforts span
experimental and individual difference methods (Cush-
man, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Greene, Cushman, Stew-
art, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2009; Greene et al.,
2008; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007;
Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008; Valdesolo & DeSteno,
2006; 2008) as well as neuroimaging and lesion studies
(Ciaramelli, Muccioli, Ladavas, & Di Pellegrino, 2007;
Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007; Moll, Eslinger,
Oliveira-Souza, 2001). On the whole, the balance of this
work has supported the DPM in its broad strokes while
also providing for revision and clarification of the de-
tails of its elaboration (but see Moll & de Oliveira-Souza,
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2007, and Greene, 2007).
The original empirical foundation of the DPM (Greene
et al., 2001) depended on the distinction between per-
sonal and impersonal moral dilemmas. Personal dilem-
mas are those that, according to Greene et al. (2001), re-
quire the harming (or killing) of another person or per-
sons by an agent to achieve some goal, specifically when
that harm is not simply redirected from one person or
group onto another (that is, the agent must generate the
harm themselves). Impersonal dilemmas are those that
do not satisfy some aspect of these requirements. The key
piece of behavioral evidence from Greene et al. (2001)
providing support for the DPM was a response time (RT)
interaction between response and dilemma type, such that
responses affirming the moral appropriateness of harming
or killing in personal dilemmas were associated with sig-
nificantly longer RTs than disavowing such actions, but
there were no differences in RTs for responses to imper-
sonal dilemmas. This effect, in conjunction with conso-
nant neuroimaging data, led Greene et al. to infer that
personal dilemmas triggered an automatic/affective pro-
cessing system, which biased responding toward the neg-
ative and decreased RTs for these responses. However,
cognitive control mechanisms were sometimes recruited
to support more abstract, outcome-oriented processing
of personal dilemmas, described in the paper as utilitar-
ian responding. When prepotent negative responses were
overridden, subjects took longer to respond to the sce-
nario and tended to affirm the moral appropriateness of
killing to save others, thereby producing the RT interac-
tion between response and dilemma type. A similar inter-
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action emerged in a later study (Greene et al., 2004), and
neuroimaging data again supported this interpretation.
Recently, McGuire and colleagues (2009) pointed out
a potentially serious flaw in the original work of Greene
and colleagues (2001). Specifically, their criticism rested
on an item analysis performed to test the psychometric
properties of the dilemmas used in that experiment and
thereby the theoretical assumptions based on effects ob-
served when using them as stimuli. The results of that
reanalysis showed that the RT interaction was spurious,
driven entirely by a subset of dilemmas that could rea-
sonably be considered stimulus outliers or non-dilemmas.
Upon elimination of the poorly constructed materials, re-
peating the original RT analysis of Greene et al. (2001)
yielded an effect very different from that reported—
personal moral dilemmas simply took longer to respond
to than did impersonal ones. This appears to be a critical
problem, since the DPM asserts that the personal dilem-
mas are preferentially triggering automatic, affective, and
fast processing, whereas the impersonal dilemmas do not,
but rather are processed in a more voluntary, abstract,
and slow fashion. The reanalysis yielded a pattern of
RT effects that contradicted this interpretation. McGuire
et al. drew two conclusions from this result. They ar-
gued that there is not sufficient evidence to support either
the strong distinction between personal and impersonal
moral dilemmas or a dual process model of moral judg-
ment more generally.
In a response to McGuire et al., Greene (2009) argued
that their criticism conflates the personal/impersonal dis-
tinction with the DPM more generally and that McGuire
et al. ignore substantial evidence for the DPM that has
been gathered since the original 2001 study, evidence
that does not depend on the personal/impersonal distinc-
tion as originally articulated (e.g., Greene et al., 2004;
Greene et al., 2008). On our reading of this exchange, the
key question up for debate now is whether or not there
is evidence that utilitarian responses to personal moral
dilemmas engender cognitive conflict (compared to non-
utilitarian responses) whereas such responding to imper-
sonal dilemmas does not. Greene (2009) reviewed several
neuroimaging studies that reported results consistent with
the increased recruitment of cognitive control structures
(e.g., lateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) when sub-
jects approved harming in a personal moral dilemma, but
in order to avoid redundancy, we will pass over these. In-
stead, we offer additional and independent evidence on
this point by reanalyzing a large, previously published
data set (Moore et al., 2008) and demonstrating novel
findings in support of the conflict claim on the part of the
DPM. This new evidence is strengthened by a new empir-
ical study that replicates the results across disparate cul-
tures, suggesting that the DPM is tracking a fundamental
fact about human moral cognition.
2 Analysis 1
Moore et al. (2008) published a complex dataset that
addressed several factors that affect moral judgment.
Briefly, they demonstrated that moral approval of killing
one to save many: (1) decreases as a function of physical
directness (vs. environmentally mediated harm); (2) in-
creases as a function of self interest (i.e., subjects were
more likely to judge the killing as morally acceptable
if it saved themselves as well as others vs. saving only
others when their own life was not at risk); and (3) in-
creases when the one to-be-sacrificed person would die
regardless of the subjects’ choice. Moreover, the authors
demonstrated that, regardless of the type of response, re-
sponse times were significantly faster for personal dilem-
mas than those for impersonal ones. This latter finding
is the opposite of the results of McGuire et al.’s reanal-
ysis. Moore et al. (2008) argued that this result was the
product of having matched their personal and impersonal
dilemmas for complexity and length. They pointed out
that Greene et al. (2001) had personal dilemmas that were
longer and more complex than their impersonal ones, and
that this confounded the interpretation of their evidence.
We will return to the RT results below with new data.
The useful contribution of McGuire et al. was to point
out that observed results such as these could be driven
by outlier examples within a stimulus category. Here
we conduct an item analysis on data from Moore et al.
(2008) in an effort to test the validity and robustness of
the reported personal/impersonal effect. A key aspect of
McGuire et al.’s strategy was to eliminate dilemmas from
their analysis if less than 5% of subjects approved of the
proposed action. It was this criterion that demonstrated
the artifactual nature of the RT effect originally reported
by Greene et al. (2001). However, this strategy depends
on the fact that Greene et al. used different dilemmas
in the personal and impersonal categories, and therefore
does not apply to Moore et al.’s (2008) materials. This is
because, with respect to the personal/impersonal effect,
each scenario served in both categories, though no sub-
ject saw both versions of any scenario. Thus, if a par-
ticular scenario was approved less than 5% in one cate-
gory but more than that in the other, this effect is prop-
erly attributable to the experimentally manipulated vari-
able since all other details of the dilemmas were kept con-
stant.1
1Only four of 24 dilemmas failed to show a difference in response
preference in the predicted direction (i.e. Impersonal > Personal). Leave
one out bootstrapping reproduced the direction and significance of the
reported effect of personal vs. impersonal 100% of the time for re-
sponses and 75% of the time for the RT results.
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2.1 Method
We performed a between item ANOVA where our depen-
dent variable was the across-subjects proportion of moral
approval for each dilemma and the cases were individ-
ual dilemmas (i.e., we treated dilemmas as subjects). The
task for the subjects was to indicate whether or not they
found a suggested course of action in a moral dilemma
to be morally appropriate, which they indicated via but-
ton press on a standard keyboard (as done by Greene et
al., 2001). For our purposes we will focus on the per-
sonal/impersonal effect and ignore the others, as they
were by design orthogonal to it.2
2.2 Results and discussion
When killing one to save many, there was significantly
less moral approval for personal compared to impersonal
killing, F(1, 46) = 5.45, p = .02, η2p = .11. Similarly,
RTs were faster for personal dilemmas compared to im-
personal, F(1, 46) = 4.62, p = .037, η2p= .09. This repli-
cates the previously reported effects of Moore et al. and
demonstrates some measure of reliability for the per-
sonal/impersonal distinction, operationalized as relative
directness of action.
3 Analysis 2
Both the item analysis reported here and Moore et al.
showed that responses to personal moral dilemmas were
faster overall than those to impersonal dilemmas. How-
ever, it has widely been recognized that RT data contain
more information than is captured by simple summary
statistics such as the mean (Ratcliff, 1979). Perhaps there
is evidence in the available RT data that supports the idea
of a greater amount of conflict in utilitarian responding to
personal moral dilemmas. One method of interrogating
this possibility is to examine the distribution of RTs di-
rectly and estimate the underlying generative parameters
using maximum likelihood methods. One such approach
that has been used for exactly the purpose that we propose
is the Ex-Gaussian method (Brown & Heathcote, 2003;
Heathcote, Brown, & Mewhort, 1991; McGill, 1963).
This approach acknowledges the positive skew of RT data
by proposing that such distributions are generated by the
convolvement of a Gaussian and an Exponential distribu-
tion. The former has the standard parameters µ and σ, and
the Exponential has one parameter, τ . The mean of the
Ex-Gaussian distribution equals µ + τ , and the variance
is σ2 + τ2. In this case, it is the exponential parameter
that produces the skewed tail of the RT distribution and
2The other main effects reported by Moore et al. also replicate in an
item analysis. Results are available on request.
contributes to the observed mean. While the µ parameter
reflects the decision component in the pure sense, the τ
parameter is theorized to reflect a response transduction
component of cognitive processing and accordingly has
been shown to systematically relate to the increased de-
mand for conflict resolution (Heathcote, Popiel, & Me-
whort, 1991; Spieler, Balota, & Faust, 1996; Spieler,
Balota, & Faust, 2000; Steinhauser & Hubner, 2009).
If the DPM is accurate and utilitarian responding to per-
sonal moral dilemmas involves response conflict requir-
ing cognitive control to overcome while non-utilitarian
responding does not, then at minimum we should expect
a greater estimate for the exponential parameter τ for this
condition relative to the others.
3.1 Method
We averaged RTs over all subjects into four cate-
gories formed from the factorial crossing of the fac-
tors dilemma type (personal/impersonal, collapsing over
self/other and inevitable/avoidable) and response type
(approval/disapproval) while treating dilemmas as cases.
In order to reliably determine the variability of the pa-
rameter estimates from the Ex-Gaussian estimation we
used leave-one-out bootstrapping to create new data sets
for each category. We sampled with replacement 100
times for each of 24 iterations (one iteration for each cen-
sored dilemma pair). Then we estimated the best fitting
Ex-Gaussian parameters for each of those RT distribu-
tions using QMPE v2.18, a freely available quantile max-
imum likelihood estimator software package (Heathcote,
Brown, & Cossineau, 2004; Heathcote, Brown, & Me-
whort, 2002).3
3.2 Results and discussion
The average parameter values are reported in Table 1.
It is reassuring that, much like the aggregate statisti-
cal results reported above, the µ estimates for personal
moral dilemmas were smaller than for impersonal, t(22)
= −9.21, p < .001, d = −1.88, and there was no effect
of response for this parameter, t < 1 . The τ parameter
estimate was larger across the personal dilemmas (M =
1713.4, SE = 172.55) relative to the impersonal ones (M
= 969.7, SE = 161.6), t(22) = 4.45, p < .001, d = 0.91,
suggesting greater conflict in personal dilemmas than in
impersonal dilemmas, regardless of response. This may
be due to the fact that in personal dilemmas one must
weigh the value of saving lives against sacrificing an-
other in a fashion that is emotionally provocative, where
in the impersonal dilemmas this emotional provocation
3Available from http://newcl.org/?q=node/10. Note that
we calculated estimates on the raw data, not the computed quantiles.
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Table 1: Parameter estimates for RT distributions by personal/impersonal and response, from Moore, Clark, and Kane
(2008). Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimates.
Dilemma type
Personal Impersonal
Parameter Appropriate Inappropriate Appropriate Inappropriate
µ 3062.0 (117.0) 3115.1 (112.0) 4540.2 (215.3) 4656.0 (211.0)
σ 686.1 (141.9) 1001.8 (130.4) 1845.9 (193.5) 2194.3 (200.1)
τ 1924.9 (202.5) 1501.9 (142.6) 917.0 (220.0) 1022.4 (103.2)
is (relatively) absent. As predicted, the τ parameter esti-
mate for moral approval of killing in a personal dilemma
was larger than for disapproval in the same category, one
tailed t(22) = 2.45, p < .025, d = 0.50.
These results suggest that there is evidence both for
increased conflict involved in the processing of personal
moral dilemmas, compared to impersonal, and that this
conflict is selectively greater in those cases when subjects
approve moral harm in personal dilemmas than when
they disapprove of such harm. Moreover, this effect may
be masked by aggregate statistics. However, reanalysis
can only take us so far, since it is based on the assump-
tion that the original sample is truly representative and
random. A stronger test of the assertions that personal
moral dilemmas involve additional conflict relative to im-
personal ones and that conflict is greater when respond-
ing in a utilitarian fashion than in a non-utilitarian fash-
ion would be replication of these results across disparate
groups of subjects. To make this test as strong as possi-
ble, as well as to rigorously replicate the effects reported
by Moore et al. (2008), we chose to compare groups of
subjects who have been shown to reliably differ in their
decision making styles in similar paradigms. If they nev-
ertheless produce effects similar to those discussed above
then this will be strong evidence for the reliability of the
conclusions that form the core of the DPM.
4 Experiment 1
Since Markus and Kitayama’s (1991) seminal proposal
that Asians follow an interdependent self-construal style
whereas Westerners follow an independent self-construal
style, a large body of research has reported corresponding
cross-cultural differences in both social cognition (see,
e.g., Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Oyserman
& Lee, 2008); and cognition in general (see, e.g., Nis-
bett, Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Nisbett, 2003).
One reported cognitive difference is that Asians tend to
reason holistically, considering more contextual factors,
and intuitively, by recalling prior experience or existing
beliefs, thereby being more likely to succumb to the so-
called “belief bias” where one’s judgment of an argu-
ment’s deductive validity is affected by whether the con-
clusion matches the reasoner’s real world belief (see, e.g.,
Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983). On the other hand,
Westerners tend to reason deliberately by applying logi-
cal rules (Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, & Nisbett, 2002; but
see Unsworth & Medin, 2005, for a challenge to the belief
bias finding). A direct cross-cultural comparison of re-
sponses to the moral dilemmas we have investigated thus
far would therefore be relevant, as it could be argued ei-
ther that (1) Asians, who tend to have an interdependent
construal of self, may have a stronger bias towards saving
more people at the expense of a single individual when
compared to Westerners, or that (2) Asians, who tend to
favor intuitive reasoning, would show a higher level of
disapproval for personal killing than would Westerners.
As moral judgment, at least insofar as it is tapped by these
kinds of hypothetical dilemmas, is clearly a species of so-
cial cognition, the possibility that these groups might not
treat the personal/impersonal distinction in the same way
represents a test of the claims of the DPM.
A substantial proportion of previous work on cultural
differences in moral judgment has dealt with the question
of whether human moral psychology is fundamentally
concerned with harms (psychological, political, or phys-
ical) or whether cultural influences extend the domain
of moral concern to other areas, depending on the id-
iosyncrasies of the cultures in question (Haidt, Koller, &
Dias, 1993; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Shweder,
Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig,
1987). O’Neill and Petrinovich (1998) have shown many
aspects of moral judgment to be similar in Taiwanese
and U.S. subjects, but they did not investigate any dis-
tinction in the type of action undertaken, but rather fo-
cused on action vs. inaction. Likewise, Baron and Miller
(2001) found that both Indian and American subjects
found action of harming to be worse than inaction re-
sulting in harm. More recent work, using a large on-
line sample, has investigated moral judgment while at-
tempting to control for the type of action taken, but did
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not directly address the personal/impersonal distinction
(Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Hauser, Cushman,
Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 2007). Moreover, these latter
studies did not directly test cultural differences (this in-
formation was used only as a covariate), and data were
gathered only from English speaking subjects who logged
onto the relevant website. Our goal here was to test the
robustness of the personal/impersonal effect by directly
comparing samples of subjects from two disparate cul-
tures. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to gather
moral judgments about personal vs. impersonal dilem-
mas from two cultures in their native languages. To this
end, we tested subjects in the U.S. and in China using the
same battery of moral dilemmas reanalyzed above, ap-
propriately translated. We predicted that the patterns of
judgments reported by Moore et al. (2008) would repli-
cate in both and that the Ex-Gaussian analysis of their
RT distributions would produce the same pattern of esti-
mated parameters. If so, then that would support the con-
tentions that 1) the personal/impersonal distinction rep-
resents something fundamental about human moral cog-
nition and 2) this distinction is at least partially charac-
terized by the idea that utilitarian responding to personal
moral dilemmas involves cognitive conflict in a manner
that non-utilitarian responding does not.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Subjects
The U.S. sample consisted of 35 college students at
Princeton University who participated in exchange for
partial credit toward a course requirement (20 females).
The Chinese sample consisted of 41 college students (22
females) at the Chinese University of Hong Kong who
participated in exchange for HK $50 (approximately U.S.
$6.50). Both samples were the control groups for an un-
related experiment.
4.1.2 Materials
We used the battery of moral dilemmas used by Moore et
al. (2008) and reanalyzed above. For the Chinese sample,
two independent bilingual translators translated the stim-
uli into Chinese. They were then back-translated by the
second author and compared to the original English ver-
sions. Any discrepancy in translation was resolved via
discussion among the translators and the second author.
The battery of moral dilemmas consisted of 24 sepa-
rate critical scenarios, all of which involved sacrificing
one person to save multiple others from death. Each sce-
nario had two possible resolutions; one personal, which
involved relatively direct physical harm, and one imper-
sonal, in which harm could be brought about by less di-
rect, environmentally mediated means. These two res-
olutions were matched to within ±2 words in length.
Subjects saw only one resolution (personal or imper-
sonal) to each dilemma, counterbalanced across subjects.
All dilemmas were presented in second person perspec-
tive. Half of all dilemmas involved killing one person
to save oneself and others (self) and the other half in-
volved killing to save only others (other). We crossed
the self/other and personal/impersonal variables and or-
thogonally manipulated whether the to-be-sacrificed per-
son would die regardless of the choice of the subject
(inevitable) or the to-be-sacrificed person would survive
unharmed unless the subject chose to sacrifice them to
save others (avoidable). There were thus 48 possible
dilemmas (a personal and impersonal version of each of
24), and each subject saw 24 of them, 6 from each of
the 4 conditions defined by personal/impersonal and in-
evitable/avoidable. We also included 14 filler dilemmas
that involved other social decisions of a moral nature (e.g.
cheating, stealing, or lying) that did not require harming
or killing.
4.1.3 Procedure
After giving informed consent, all subjects were pre-
sented with the text of the dilemmas as black text on a
grey computer screen. Dilemmas were presented indi-
vidually in a different randomized order for each sub-
ject. Each dilemma was presented in two paragraphs.
After reading the first paragraph of the problem, subjects
pressed the spacebar to cause each sentence of the resolu-
tion to appear, one at a time. All text remained visible on
the screen until the subject responded by pressing one of
two allowable buttons on the keyboard to indicate that the
proposed action was “morally appropriate” or “morally
inappropriate”. This was the procedure used by Moore
et al. (2008). The computer collected responses and RTs
for the dilemmas. Afterward, subjects were debriefed and
thanked.
4.2 Results of Experiment 1
All null hypothesis significance tests are non-directional
with α = .05 unless otherwise indicated. Effect sizes are
reported as partial eta squared (η2p) or Cohen’s d. The
assumption of equality of group covariance matrices was
not violated for the response data, so we present univari-
ate results. Two subjects were dropped from the Chinese
sample for responding randomly and a third whose RTs
were trimmed as outliers, leaving 39 subjects for analy-
sis of responses and 38 for analysis of times. For ease of
presentation and continuity with the above discussion, we
will present only those results that were statistically sig-
nificant, while focusing on the personal/impersonal effect
for the Ex-Gaussian RT analysis.
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Table 2: Mean proportion (standard deviation) of “appropriate” responses by country and dilemma type.
U.S. China
Inevitable Avoidable Inevitable Avoidable
Personal-Self .71 (.35) .51 (.41) .53 (.37) .43 (.33)
Personal-Other .57 (.30) .40 (.27) .47 (.30) .31 (.35)
Impersonal-Self .78 (35) .67 (.31) .62 (.38) .57 (.35)
Impersonal-Other .69 (.30) .45 (.32) .61 (.29) .44 (.32)
Table 3: Parameter estimates for RT distributions by personal/impersonal and response, for Chinese and U.S. samples.
Values in parentheses are standard errors of the estimates.
Dilemma type
Personal Impersonal
Parameter Appropriate Inappropriate Appropriate Inappropriate
China µ 3311.7 (144.1) 3427.3 (162.0) 3792.0 (184.9) 3820.2 (166.3)
σ 731.2 (151.4) 483.9 (205.5) 631.4 (180.9) 497.8 (202.3)
τ 2214.2 (155.0) 1976.6 (177.6) 1465.1 (274.4) 1550.2 (297.1)
U.S. µ 3017.0 (126.3) 2887.3 (210.1) 3507.5 (213.0) 3703.9 (254.8)
σ 526.9 (120.1) 550.3 (153.9) 762.9 (106.2) 1224.5 (207.4)
τ 1874.5 (130.3) 1531.0 (159.6) 1029.6 (167.5) 1279.0 (206.1)
4.2.1 Responses
We used the proportion of dilemmas in each
category for which subjects morally approved
of the action as the dependent measure in a
2 (U.S./China) x 2 (personal/impersonal) x 2 (self/other)
x 2 (inevitable/avoidable death) mixed factorial ANOVA
where the dilemma variables were manipulated within
subjects. The mean levels of moral approval by dilemma
type and country are presented in Table 2.
Across both samples, subjects found physically indi-
rect killing (impersonal) to be more morally appropri-
ate than direct (personal), F(1, 72) = 24.14, p < .001,
η2p = .25. Killing to save oneself and others (self) was
more morally appropriate than killing to save only oth-
ers (other), F(1, 72) = 32.93, p < .001, η2p = .31. Killing
someone who would die anyway (inevitable death) was
more morally appropriate than killing someone who
would otherwise survive (avoidable death), F(1, 72) =
47.81, p < .001, η2p = .40. There was not a significant
effect of culture, F(1, 71) = 3.1, p > .08, η2p = .04. There
were no interactions between any of the dilemma factors
and country/culture, all Fs < 2.3, all ps > .14. Thus, the
overall pattern of conditional means was not significantly
different across these samples.
4.2.2 Response times
As articulated above, the rationale behind conducting the
Ex-Gaussian analysis is to use the three inferred param-
eters for significance tests instead of only the observed
mean and standard deviation. Thus, we conducted sep-
arate Ex-Gaussian analyses on the U.S. and the Chinese
samples to determine if the predicted pattern of parame-
ter estimates would emerge from both groups. For each
sample we created four categories by crossing the per-
sonal/impersonal factor and response type. We then sam-
pled with replacement 100 times to create 24 new datasets
leaving out one dilemma in each set.
4.2.3 Chinese RT parameter estimates
As can be seen in Table 3, the estimates for µ were sig-
nificantly smaller for personal compared to impersonal
dilemmas, paired samples t(22) = −2.66, p < .02, d =
−0.54. There was no significant difference between the
estimates for moral approval vs. disapproval in personal
or impersonal dilemmas, ts < 1.
As we predicted, and in accord with the results from
the reanalysis, the τ parameter is significantly larger for
personal dilemmas than for impersonal, t(22) = 2.60, p <
.02, d = 0.53. However, there was only a trend for larger
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estimates for utilitarian responses to personal dilemmas
than for non-utilitarian responses, one tailed t(22) = 2.78,
p = .074, d = 0.29. The τ parameter was not signifi-
cantly different for utilitarian compared to non-utilitarian
responses within impersonal dilemmas, t < 1.
4.2.4 U.S. RT parameter estimates
Referring to Table 3, again we find that the estimates for
µ were significantly smaller for personal compared to im-
personal dilemmas, t(22) = −3.25, p < .005, d = −0.66.
There was no significant difference as a function of re-
sponse for either personal or impersonal dilemmas, ts
< 1. Once again, the τ estimate for personal dilemmas
is larger than for impersonal, t(22) = 3.31, p < .005, d
= 0.67. The τ estimate for utilitarian responses to per-
sonal dilemmas is significantly larger than that for non-
utilitarian responses, t(22) = 2.37, one-tailed p < .015, d
= .48, but the estimates for utilitarian responses to imper-
sonal dilemmas was not significantly larger than for non-
utilitarian responses, t(22) = −1.34, p > .15, d = −0.27.
4.3 Discussion of Experiment 1
Both U.S. and Chinese subjects found relatively indi-
rect, environmentally mediated killing to be more morally
acceptable than the same death caused by more direct,
physical means. Similarly, both samples showed higher
moral approval of killing to save oneself and others than
of killing to save only others and higher moral approval
of killing when death was inevitable than when death
was avoidable. There were no significant differences be-
tween the U.S. and Chinese subjects in the pattern of
their responses across the eight different dilemma types
used here. Ex-Gaussian analysis of RT distributions indi-
cated that utilitarian responding to personal moral dilem-
mas involves more conflict than non-utilitarian respond-
ing, and that personal moral dilemmas generally involve
more conflict than impersonal dilemmas regardless of re-
sponse.
Our goal in this experiment was twofold. First, we
sought to determine whether the factors we manipulated
genuinely tap fundamental aspects of human moral cog-
nition, as we have previously argued. It was possible that,
although these materials survived an item analysis based
on a large U.S. sample, they might nevertheless fail to
generalize to another language and culture or to another
U.S. sample of different demographic makeup. Second,
we investigated the replicability of the Ex-Gaussian re-
sults from our reanalysis in order to gauge the strength of
the finding as evidence for the DPM. The DPM claims
that utilitarian responding to personal moral dilemmas
involves cognitive conflict to a greater degree than does
non-utilitarian responding, a claim that receives support
here in the form of Ex-Gaussian τ parameter estimates.
These estimates were larger for personal dilemmas than
for impersonal, and larger for utilitarian responses than
for non-utilitarian responses to personal dilemmas. This
replicates the results from the previous reanalysis. The
overall replication of previous results across very differ-
ent languages and socio-cultural samples reinforces sup-
port for the personal/impersonal distinction as well as in-
troducing novel evidence that favors the DPM’s claims of
increased conflict in personal dilemmas.
5 General discussion
The DPM has served quite well to organize thinking and
research on human moral judgment, particularly with re-
spect to connecting empirical behavioral results to neural
structures and function. McGuire et al. raised the valid
point that methodological flaws may have produced the
illusion of a pattern where none truly existed, thus possi-
bly undermining the DPM’s attempt to connect automatic
moral intuitions and consequentialist moral judgments to
separable neural circuitries. The original definition of
personal vs. impersonal moral dilemmas roughly tracked
those problems that evoke automatic intuitions and those
that do not. Subsequent research from a variety of sources
has shown that this definition can be narrowed, and meth-
ods refined, to isolate particular factors responsible for
the evocation of such automatic responses, including di-
rect physical contact (Cushman et al., 2006; Moore et al.,
2008), self interest (Moore et al., 2008), and intention-
ality (Cushman et al., 2006). The current results demon-
strate the importance of creating carefully constructed ex-
perimental materials. As mentioned in the Introduction,
the original dilemmas constructed by Greene et al. (2001)
were not matched for length, causal structure, or com-
plexity. This clearly confounds the interpretation of RT
data and lead to a larger debate about generalizability. In
contrast, Moore et al. (2008) constructed dilemmas that
were well matched on these dimensions, and these mate-
rials survived the item analysis and a cross-cultural repli-
cation reported above.
As research on the possible mechanisms of moral judg-
ment has progressed, support for the DPM has increased.
The current results have shown that factors previously
identified as playing a strong role in moral judgment,
particularly the personal/impersonal effect, seem to be
robust across cultures. Perhaps more importantly, we
have shown that there is intriguing new evidence that per-
sonal moral dilemmas involve greater conflict than im-
personal ones, and this is particularly true when sub-
jects respond in a utilitarian, or consequentialist, fash-
ion within personal dilemmas. Taken in conjunction with
other studies that have shown selective impairment of
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such judgments by cognitive load (Greene et al., 2008)
and greater recruitment of cognitive control regions of
the prefrontal cortex when giving utilitarian vs. non-
utilitarian responses to personal moral dilemmas (Greene
et al., 2004), this evidence reinforces support for the
DPM.
The DPM, in addition to being compatible with a wide
variety of empirical work, has generated several ques-
tions for future research. Among the most interesting
of these questions, yet to be answered, are: When and
why is more effortful, abstract processing recruited for
moral judgment? What is the nature of this processing
in algorithmic terms? Are there stable differences among
individuals as to their likelihood to engage in such effort-
ful cognition in the moral domain? As we move toward
answers to these questions, the form and content of the
DPM will adapt to accommodate these developments if it
is to survive as a useful characterization.
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Appendix
Modified submarine
Personal version
You are a crewperson on a marine-research submarine
traveling underneath a large iceberg. An onboard ex-
plosion has damaged the ship, killed and injured several
crewmembers. Additionally, it has collapsed the only ac-
cess corridor between the upper and lower parts of the
ship. The upper section, where you and most of the oth-
ers are located, does not have enough oxygen remaining
for all of you to survive until you reach the surface. Only
one remaining crewmember is located in the lower sec-
tion, where there is enough oxygen.
There is an emergency access hatch between the up-
per and lower sections of the ship. If released, it will
fall to the deck and allow oxygen to reach the upper sec-
tion. However, a crewmember in the lower section was
knocked unconscious and is lying beneath the hatch while
you and the rest of the crew are almost out of air. If
you shove the hatch open you and the others will have
air, but it will fall to the deck, crushing the unconscious
crewmember.
Is it appropriate for you to open the hatch and crush
the crewmember below to save yourself and the other
crewmembers?
Impersonal version
You are a crewperson on a marine-research submarine
traveling underneath a large iceberg. An onboard ex-
plosion has damaged the ship, killed and injured several
crewmembers. Additionally, it has collapsed the only ac-
cess corridor between the upper and lower parts of the
ship. The upper section, where you and most of the oth-
ers are located, does not have enough oxygen remaining
for all of you to survive until you reach the surface. Only
one remaining crewmember is located in the lower sec-
tion, where there is enough oxygen.
There is an emergency access hatch between the upper
and lower sections of the ship. If released by an emer-
gency switch, it will fall to the deck and allow oxygen to
reach the area where you and the others are. However,
the hatch will crush the crewmember below, since he was
knocked unconscious and is lying beneath it. You and the
rest of the crew are almost out of air though, and you will
all die if you do not do this.
Is it appropriate for you to release the hatch and crush
the crewmember below to save yourself and the other
crew members?
Modified rowboat
Personal version
You are in a rowboat with a tour guide while sight-seeing
on a lake in Alaska. You notice that three children have
overturned their boat nearby. They are now in danger of
quickly freezing to death in the icy water. You begin to
row over to rescue them when you realize that your boat
will not hold you, the tour guide, and the three children.
Two of the children are closer to your boat than the
third child. As you and the tour guide pull in the first two
it is obvious that one of them is too heavy and if you keep
him on board your boat will sink and all of the children
will die. Neither you nor the guide can get out because
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you are rowing and the guide is performing CPR. The
only way to save two children is to throw the large child
off the boat and rescue the third one.
Is it appropriate to throw one child off the boat to die
in order to save the other two?
Impersonal version
You are in a rowboat with a tour guide while sight-seeing
on a lake in Alaska. You notice that three children have
overturned their boat nearby. They are now in danger of
quickly freezing to death in the icy water. You begin to
row over to rescue them when you realize that your boat
will not hold you, the tour guide, and the three children.
Two of the children are closer to your boat than the
third child. As you and the tour guide pull in the first
two it is obvious that they are too heavy and if you try
to rescue the third child your boat will sink and all of the
children will die. Neither you nor the guide can get out
because you are rowing and the guide is performing CPR.
The only way to save the two children is to row quickly
away from the third one, leaving him to die.
Is it appropriate to leave the one child behind to die in
order to save the other two?
